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During 2006, the Gallup Organization conducted a World Poll that used an identical questionnaire
for national samples of adults from 132 countries. I analyze the data on life satisfaction (happiness)
and on health satisfaction and look at their relationships with national income, age, and life-expectancy.
Average happiness is strongly related to per capita national income; each doubling of income is associated
with a near one point increase in life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10. Unlike most previous findings,
the effect holds across the range of international incomes; if anything, it is slightly stronger among
rich countries. Conditional on national income, recent economic growth makes people unhappier, improvements
in life-expectancy make them happier, but life-expectancy itself has little effect. Age has an internationally
inconsistent relationship with happiness. National income moderates the effects of aging on self-reported
health, and the decline in health satisfaction and rise in disability with age are much stronger in poor
countries than in rich countries. In line with earlier findings, people in much of Eastern Europe and
in the countries of the former Soviet Union are particularly unhappy and particularly dissatisfied with
their health, and older people in those countries are much less satisfied with their lives and with their
health than are younger people. HIV prevalence in Africa has little effect on Africans' life or health
satisfaction; the fraction of Kenyans who are satisfied with their personal health is the same as the
fraction of Britons and higher than the fraction of Americans. The US ranks 81st out of 115 countries
in the fraction of people who have confidence in their healthcare system, and has a lower score than
countries such as India, Iran, Malawi, or Sierra Leone. While the strong relationship between life-satisfaction
and income gives some credence to the measures, as do the low levels of life and health satisfaction
in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, the lack of correlations between life
and health satisfaction and health measures shows that happiness (or self-reported health) measures









This paper looks at the effects of income and age on self-reported wellbeing in more than 
a hundred countries. I am particularly concerned with self-reports of life satisfaction, of 
health, and of disability, with how these measures change with age, and with how the 
effects of age differ across countries according to their level of development and their 
region of the world. The analysis is based on the Gallup World Poll, which collected data 
from samples of people in each of 132 countries during 2006; with the exception of 
Angola, Cuba, and Myanmar, the samples are nationally representative of people aged 15 
and older. Because the survey used the same questionnaire in all countries, it provides an 
opportunity to make cross-country comparisons while, at the same time, providing 
enough data to permit within-country disaggregation, for example, by age, sex, ethnicity 
or education. 
  The World Poll data are particularly rich in self-reported measures, including a 
“ladder” question for life-satisfaction, questions on whether or not people are satisfied 
with their state of health, whether they have health problems that prevent them from 
doing things that people at their age can usually do, whether or not they have confidence 
in the healthcare or medical system, and whether or not they are satisfied with their 
standard of living. While these measures are far short of those that might appear in a 
comprehensive health and economics survey for a single country or a group of similar 
countries, they have the great advantage of having been asked in exactly the same way in 
all of the countries. The question is not, therefore, whether these self-reports are adequate 
measures of individual health—they clearly are not—but whether they provide useful 
measures of population health. In particular, it is possible that individual self-reported 
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temperament, or individual expectations than of any objective circumstance, but the same 
might not be true for the population, or for age groups within it. In consequence, one of 
my main objectives is to investigate the usefulness of these simple, cheap, and 
comparable questions as supplemental measures of population or subpopulation health. 
  I begin with a theoretical discussion of age-effects and income effects on life 
satisfaction, where life satisfaction is interpreted as period sub-utility in the economists’ 
standard life-cycle model of consumption. Such a formulation essentially assumes that 
income and happiness are positively linked, but it offers more interesting predictions 
about the effects of age, for example that life satisfaction should fall more rapidly with 
age in countries with higher adult mortality rates, for example in places with high 
prevalence of HIV-AIDS. Under appropriate and plausible assumptions, the theory also 
predicts an inverse U-shaped age-profile of utility. I follow this, in Section 3, with a brief 
summary of what the happiness literature—including the literature in psychology—says 
about the relationship between happiness and age. 
  Section 4 turns to the World Poll data. I look first at general life-satisfaction based on 
a ladder question, how it varies with national income, with age, and with age at different 
levels of national income. Like earlier studies using a smaller range of countries, I find 
that the citizens of richer countries are on average more satisfied with their lives than the 
citizens of poorer countries. Unlike most earlier studies, this effect of income is not 
confined to poor, unhappy countries, but extends right across the range, from Cambodia, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Niger, and Chad, which share the unenviable distinction of being in 
the bottom ten countries both by income and by life-satisfaction, to Norway, Switzerland, 
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life-satisfaction. Each doubling of national income is associated with a near one unit 
increase in average life-satisfaction measured on an eleven point scale from 0 (“the worst 
possible life”) to 10 (“the best possible life”). If anything, the effect of national income 
on national happiness is somewhat stronger in the rich countries than in the poor 
countries.  
  Recent growth in national income, unlike income itself, lowers average life-
satisfaction. This result contradicts much earlier literature that argues that improvements 
in living standards make people better-off, but that the effect wears off over time. 
  The pattern of life satisfaction at different ages differs according to the level of 
economic development. In 2006, life satisfaction was much worse among the elderly than 
among the young in poor and middle-income countries. By contrast, in rich countries, 
especially the English speaking rich countries, the elderly were relatively satisfied with 
their lives, sometimes more satisfied than those in midlife. The elderly in the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are particularly dissatisfied with their lives. I 
find no evidence from the 2006 cross-sections that life-satisfaction declines with age 
more rapidly in countries where adult mortality is particularly high.  
  In Section 5, I show that in almost all countries and for all age groups, satisfaction 
with health declines with age, and is lowest among the elderly. More interesting is the  
fact that the rate of deterioration is much faster in poor than in rich countries, and in some 
of the richest, satisfaction with health actually rises toward the end of life. Reports of 
limiting health conditions behave similarly, worsening much more rapidly with age in 
poor countries than in rich. It appears that one of the benefits of being rich, or at least of 
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satisfaction with health. While satisfaction with health is higher in places where more 
people have confidence in their health and medical systems (or vice versa), confidence in 
the healthcare system is only weakly correlated with GDP. Particularly remarkable is the 
position of the largest rich country, the United States, where only 52 percent of the 
population express themselves satisfied with the healthcare and medical system, a figure 
that is not only much lower than the comparable figure in any other rich country—for 
example, in Britain the fraction is 63 percent—but also lower than the fractions in (to 
take a few examples from many) India, Iran, Sierra Leone, or Malawi. The US ranks 81st 
among the 115 countries for which these data were collected.  
  All of the health measures, in levels and in rates of decline with age, are particularly 
unfavorable in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Some of the 
dissatisfaction with health in these countries can certainly be linked to their recent decline 
in health and life-expectancy. But there have been much larger declines in life-
expectancy elsewhere associated with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and people in countries 
with high prevalence do not express anything like the same levels of dissatisfaction with 
their health. Indeed, the fraction of Kenyans who are satisfied with their personal health 
is the same as the fraction of Britons, and is higher than the fraction of Americans. 
  Section 6 discusses the usefulness of the satisfaction measures for the purpose of 
assessing population health and wellbeing. The ladder question on life-satisfaction is 
strongly correlated with per capita GDP across countries, and increases linearly with the 
logarithm of income in rich countries as well as poor. However, the links between life-
satisfaction and life expectancy or HIV prevalence, or even between health-satisfaction 
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of health and income combined. The same would be true for some combination of life 
satisfaction and health satisfaction. Particularly troubling is the fact that HIV prevalence 
appears to have little or no effect on the fraction of the population reporting 
dissatisfaction with their health. Using such a measure to guide or evaluate policy would 
lead to the unacceptable position that dealing with HIV/AIDS in Africa need not be an 
urgent priority. 
 
2. Life-satisfaction, income, and age: theoretical considerations 
Economists have devoted a good deal of attention to life-cycle behavior. While these 
theories were designed to predict the life cycle pattern of consumption, saving, and labor 
supply, they can also be used to think about the life-cycle pattern of utility. While it 
would be a mistake to take these predictions too seriously, they provide a framework for 
consideration and interpretation. 
  The life-satisfaction question in the World Poll asks people to imagine an eleven-rung 
ladder where the bottom (0) represents “the worst possible life for you” and the top (10) 
represents “the best possible life for you.” Respondents are then asked to report “on 
which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time.” Such a 
question might elicit an evaluation of the respondent’s complete life, as seen from “the 
present time,” or perhaps more likely, an evaluation of today’s contribution to the 
lifetime stream. From a standard life-cycle perspective, complete life utility is 
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  6where t represents age (or time), and runs from birth (0) to death (T), δ  is the rate of time 
preference,   is the survival rate, the probability of surviving from time zero to time t, 
and 
t S
( , ) tt ca υ  is the instantaneous utility—or “felicity,” to separate it from U—function 
which depends on consumption at age t and other factors a sometimes referred to as 
“taste shifters”. I follow the standard, but by no means innocuous, assumption that utility 
is intertemporally additive, which allows us to talk about instantaneous and lifetime 
utility in a simple way. For someone currently of age t, the part of (1) from the past will 
be known, with the remainder an expectation. Consumption is chosen so as to maximize 
(1) subject to a lifetime income and wealth constraint in which money can be moved 
from one period to another through lending and borrowing, for simplicity at a constant 
real interest rate r.  
  In this model, income—together with initial wealth and the interest rate—constrains 
how much utility is possible, so that, by assumption, higher incomes generate higher 
utility, within each period, and for life as a whole. Given this economic definition of 
happiness, there is no ambiguity about the proposition that income makes people happier. 
The effects of age, here represented by t, are somewhat more interesting. 
  Suppose first that life-satisfaction is taken to refer to lifetime utility U. In the absence 
of uncertainty, lifetime utility U does not change over time. With uncertainty, U will 
change from period to period in response to new information and the changes in 
consumption induced by that information. For example, under the assumptions of the life-
cycle permanent income model, consumption follows a random walk, which will induce 
random changes in U. But there will be no pattern to the changes in consumption, nor in 
U, so that there should be no systematic change in U with age. Happiness is what lifetime 
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with age. Unless there is perfect risk-sharing across people, consumption inequality—and 
under some assumptions, utility inequality—will increase with age, see Deaton and 
Paxson (1994). 
  If, instead of life time utility U, we interpret the satisfaction questions as referring to 
instantaneous utility or felicity, there is more scope for variation with age. Given that 
consumption is optimally set over the life-cycle, and taking the certainty case for 
simplicity, we must have 
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where the subscript 1 denotes the partial derivative of felicity with respect to its first 
argument—the marginal utility of consumption—and λ  is the lifetime marginal utility of 
wealth, which is independent of age. If the changes over time in consumption, the interest 
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where   indicates a change over time, and double partial derivatives are shown as 
double subscripts. Note that the proportional change in the survival rate is approximately 
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where is the mortality rate at age t. Note that, because we are talking about decision 
making about life-cycle consumption, the relevant mortality rates are those in adulthood, 
not childhood or infancy, and the former vary a good deal less across poor and rich 
countries than do the latter. 
t m
  8  Equation (4) has a number of useful implications. The marginal utility of 
consumption is positive and declining ( 1 0 υ >  and  11 0 υ < ) so that, if a is constant, 
consumption will rise over time in response to r and fall in response to impatience or 
mortality (the survival rate   is falling with t). In thinking about the implications for this 
across countries, it is hard to see why there should be any systematic relationship 
between the level of national income and the difference between r and the rate of time 
preference, but there are certainly major differences in adult mortality rates. Provided the 
factor 
t S
11 1 / υ υ  does not change too much with age, the optimal lifetime choice of 
consumption will have faster rates of consumption decline the higher is the mortality rate; 
the shorter future provides an incentive to consume and be happy now or to “eat, drink, 
and be merry, for tomorrow we die.” Since the mortality rate rises rapidly with age, the 
rate of consumption decline should accelerate with age to match. Of course, consumption 
is not utility and the change in utility depends also on what is happening to .   t a
  The change in utility is given by 
  12 tt uc t a υ υ Δ =Δ+Δ (5) 
and where   and   are linked by (4). Making the substitution, and assuming for 
simplicity that r and
t c Δ t a Δ
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The first term shows that mortality has a negative effect on the rate of decline of utility, 
essentially because the rate of consumption decline rises as mortality rises. To think 
about the second term, suppose we normalize the taste factors a so that more a is 
associated with higher utility. The obvious interpretation is that a measures the capacity 
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cycle pattern of a will be chosen by the individual, at least in part, it is plausible that it 
would have an inverse U-shape, rising at first as people accumulate human capital, self-
knowledge, and the ability to enjoy themselves—learn to be happy—and then eventually  
falling as the capacity to enjoy fails with age. By this view, the marginal utility of 
consumption is higher when a is higher, so that  . Consumers will adapt their 
consumption, not to compensate for changes in a, but to take advantage of them by 
consuming most when a is highest; consumption is higher in those periods of life where it 
does the most good, in this case, in midlife. Equation (4) shows that, discounting and 
mortality effects apart, consumption change tracks taste change, and equation (6) shows 
that the effects on utility are magnified by the addition of the direct utility effects of 
changes in a. A similar story could be told about children, whose average numbers follow 
an inverse U-shape, and who, since they are generally purposively chosen might be 
supposed to enhance utility—although the empirical happiness literature often disputes 
this, see Argyle (1999), Clark and Oswald (2002), and Layard (2005)—as well as 
increasing the marginal utility of consumption by providing more opportunities for the 
parents to spend money to enjoy themselves. Once again, instantaneous utility would be 
predicted to have an inverse U-shape with age.  
12 0 υ >
  A simple explicit example illustrates further. Suppose that we continue to assume that 
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while happiness—defined here as 
11 (1 ) ( ) tt ac
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− − − —changes with age according to 
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so that the effect on mortality on the rate of change of happiness is constant, and as the 
mortality rate rises ever more rapidly with age, the rate of decline of happiness will 
accelerate. At the same time, if we look across countries with different adult mortality 
rates, the rate of decline of happiness with age should be higher in the higher mortality 
countries. 
 
3. Insights from the psychology and happiness literatures 
The psychology literature takes a different approach to questions of how happiness is 
affected by income and by age. In particular, there is no basic assumption that income 
promotes happiness; income is simply one of life’s many circumstances which may or 
may not be associated with happiness. 
  One thread emphasizes the importance of personality and temperament as 
determinants of life-satisfaction. In the most extreme version, referred to as “set-point” 
theory, people cannot be permanently moved from their personal happiness set-point 
level, and while changing life circumstances—consumption, income, and even divorce or 
the death of a loved one—affect life satisfaction, they do so only temporarily. If this strict 
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countries, we should expect to see no difference in average life-satisfaction across 
populations, at least with the exception of populations that have recently experienced a 
large positive or negative change in their circumstances. More precisely, average life 
satisfaction across countries should depend positively on changes in national income, but 
should not depend on the level of national income. Within countries, happiness should be 
independent of age. 
  More generally individual life-satisfaction is taken to depend on some combination of 
temperament and circumstance, and there has been a lively debate about which 
circumstances are important, and about which—if any—have permanent as opposed to 
merely transitory effects. For example, it is often argued that income is relatively 
unimportant, and relatively transitory compared with family circumstances, 
unemployment, or health, see Easterlin (2003). Note that even if variations in 
temperament are more important than circumstances at the individual level, the same 
need not be true of the population because temperamental differences might average out 
over populations, though nothing rules out national differences in temperament. If 
temperament does average out, population measures of life-satisfaction could be useful 
indicators of population wellbeing, even when they are poor measures for individuals. 
The conflict between concepts of capabilities or functionings, which are the measures 
argued for by Sen (1999), and of which health and income are the most important, is 
possibly much more severe for individuals than for nations. By contrast, if the strict form 
of set-point theory is true, it is impossible to make individuals or nations permanently 
happier, including through the improvements in national health and national income that 
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development. 
  The role of one particular circumstance, income, is of particular interest. Many 
within-country studies have found only a small effect of income on happiness relative to 
other life-circumstances such as employment or marital status, see for example Helliwell 
(2003) or Blanchflower and Oswald (2004). Kahneman et al (2005) argue that even these 
measures overstate the effects of income. They suggest that more income may do nothing 
for happiness, and that the observed correlation between life satisfaction and income 
comes from a “focusing illusion,” induced by the life-satisfaction question, which 
prompts respondents to compare their incomes with some standard, such as their own 
previous incomes or with the incomes of others. It is therefore possible that, over the long 
run, increases in income will generate no increase in life-satisfaction. This result is 
consistent with the micro-level evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel by Di 
Tella et al (2005), who regress life satisfaction on income and on several lags of income, 
and find that life-satisfaction adapts completely to income within four years. It is only 
income change that matters, not income itself. At the country level, a long-run zero effect 
of income is also consistent with the famous findings of Easterlin (1974, 1995) that for 
those countries for which we have data, happiness does not increase over long time spans, 
in spite of large increases in per capita income. Such theories and findings are in sharp 
contrast to the standard economic model developed above in which more consumption—
or more lifetime wealth, or lifetime income—makes people happier.  
  Whether or not set-point theory works for other circumstances—such as the death of 
a spouse, or the permanent loss of work—the results for income suggest that there is little 
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might reasonably infer that this would also be so across countries, given that most 
international income differences are long established. But the evidence does not support 
this inference. Although the US and Japan may have failed to become happier as they 
grew richer, poor countries, such as India or Nigeria, are less happy than rich countries, 
such as the US or Japan, see for example Ingelhart and Klingemann (2000), Graham 
(2005), Layard (2005), Leigh and Wolfers (2006) or the careful and balanced survey by 
Diener and Oishi (2000). As Diener and Oishi note, one argument, due to Veenhoven 
(1991), is that more income improves happiness only until basic needs are met; beyond 
the point where there is enough income so that people are no longer hungry, their 
children do not die from readily preventable diseases, and absolute poverty has been 
eliminated, income does not matter for happiness. While this story seems plausible, they 
also note that it might be only after these basic needs have been met that the possibilities 
for intellectual and cultural development can be fully explored. This is akin to Robbins’ 
(1938) account of the Brahmin who claimed to be “ten times as capable of happiness as 
that untouchable over there.”  
  An important source of previous empirical evidence is the World Values Survey, 
which covers rich countries, together with a smaller number of poor countries, as well as 
a group of countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Authors who 
have worked with these data have tended to conclude that (a) richer countries are happier, 
(b) the cross-country effect of income on happiness is larger than the within-country 
effect of income and happiness, and (c) that among the rich countries, there is no 
relationship between national income and national happiness, see again Ingelhart and 
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Western industrial countries, the richer ones are no happier than the poorer.” Findings (a) 
and (c) are consistent with the basic needs story together with a set-point or adaptive 
model in rich countries where basic needs are met, while (b) is a consequence of the 
comparison between poor countries as a group and rich countries as a group. As we shall 
see, the results from the World Poll are very different. 
  The literature on the relationship between happiness and age is essentially empirical; 
Helliwell (2003) and Easterlin (2006) review the literature, including work that finds 
essentially no effect of age, work that finds that older people are happier, and work that 
finds a U-shaped profile over the life course. As one might expect, these results are 
sensitive to which other variables are controlled—health in particular—and to what role 
is assigned to cohort and period effects when estimating age effects, see Blanchflower 
and Oswald’s reply (2007) to Easterlin.  
  
4. Life satisfaction, income and age: evidence from the World Poll 
Figure 1 shows a world map of the life-satisfaction measure from the 2006 World Poll 
data. The numbers for each individual range from 0 to 10, and the shading corresponds to 
the (sample weighted) averages for the 121 countries used here. The map looks similar to 
an income plot of the world: North America, Europe, Japan, Australasia, and Saudi 
Arabia are happy as well as rich, and the really unhappy places on the planet are in sub-
Saharan Africa, plus Haiti and Cambodia. The only countries in the bottom twenty 
according to life-satisfaction and that are relatively well-off in income terms are Georgia 
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twenty, Costa Rica and Venezuela. 
  Figure 2 summarizes a great deal of information, about the relationship between life 
satisfaction and national income, and about how that relationship changes with age, or 
equivalently, how the age profile of average life satisfaction varies across countries. The 
horizontal axis, for all plots, is per capita GDP in 2003 (the nearest year for which there 
is complete data in the Penn World Table) measured in purchasing power parity dollars at 
2000 prices. Each circle is a country, with diameter proportional to population, and marks 
average life satisfaction and GDP for that country. Important countries are labeled; most 
of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are on the bottom left, India and China are the two 
large circles near the left, the western European countries appear near the upper right, and 
the USA is the large country on the top right. There are also seven plotted lines on graph, 
only six of which are clearly visible. Each of these corresponds to an age group, 15–19, 
20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, and 70 plus. For each of these seven groups, and for 
each country, I calculated the average life-satisfaction. Each line is a non-parametric 
regression plot for one age group of its average-life-satisfaction against national per 
capita GDP (taken to be the same for all age groups in the country.) These lines can be 
thought of as a disaggregation by age of the average plot represented by the circles. 
  As with the map in Figure 1, life-satisfaction increases with GDP per head. The slope 
is steepest among the poorest countries, where income gains are associated with the 
largest increases in happiness, but it remains positive and substantial even among the rich 
countries; it is not true that there is some critical level of GDP per capita above which 
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findings reviewed in the previous section, I investigate it further. 
  Figure 3 plots average happiness against the logarithm of income, and this simple 
transform is enough to make the relationship close to linear. Column 1 of Table 1 shows 
the basic regression for the 114 countries for which we have both life-satisfaction and per 
capita PPP GDP from the Penn World Table. The coefficient is 0.859 with an estimated 
standard error of 0.051. Using the same sample, the quadratic in column (2) improves the 
fit only slightly; the t-value on the squared term is only 2.2. Note too that the quadratic 
term has a positive sign, so that the effect of log income on life satisfaction is estimated to 
increase at higher levels of income per head. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample at 
$12,000; Figure 2 shows that this is a level that splits the poor and middle-income 
countries from the rich countries. Once again, the slope in the upper income countries is 
higher, although it has a large estimated standard error. If we restrict the sample to the 24 
countries whose per capita GDP is above $20,000, the estimated slope is 0.617 with a 
standard error of 0.649, which is clearly consistent both with a zero slope, and with a 
slope that is the same as the slope in the poor countries; visual inspection of Figure 3 
shows that the latter is the obvious conclusion. The final two columns address the same 
question in a slightly different way, interacting the term in log income with, first, in 
column (6), an indicator that per capita income is above $12,000, and then second, in 
column (7), an indicator that per capita income is above $20,000. In both cases, the 
interaction term is estimated to be positive, and is significantly different from zero in the 
final column.  
  17  These results support the visual impression in Figure 3, that the logarithmic fit with a 
constant slope is adequate for all countries, rich or poor, and if there is any evidence for 
deviation, it is small and in the direction of the slope being higher among the richer 
countries. 
  Why are these results so different from those studies that have concluded that, among 
the rich countries, national income has no effect on national life satisfaction? Figure 4 
shows the data that supports these findings, taken from the 1981, 1990, and 1996 waves 
of the World Values Surveys, with each country marked by its three letter “isocode” as 
used by the Penn World Table and World Bank. For comparability with the World Poll, I 
have included only countries that appear in both sources, and I have excluded regions or 
cities. Even so, Figure 4 reproduces the main features of previous analyses. There is a 
steep relationship between happiness and income on the left of the graph, which becomes 
much flatter among the rich countries on the right. To see how this relates to the World 
Poll data, note four points: (a) apart from South Africa (ZAF) and Korea (KOR), all of 
the countries at the bottom left are in Eastern Europe or were once part of the Soviet 
Union, including Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, Estonia, and Slovakia; (b) if 
we look at the few long-term poor countries in the sample, Ghana, China, Philippines, 
Bangladesh, India, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, they all are much happier than the 
Eastern European countries; (c) as a consequence of (a) and (b), the sharply curved nature 
of the happiness to income relationship comes, not so much from the poor countries, but 
from the Eastern European and former Soviet countries, whose unhappiness is almost 
certainly not primarily due to their low incomes; (d) Figure 4, unlike Figure 3, shows 
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the happiness to log income relationship is close to linear except, once again, for the 
countries of Eastern Europe, see also Leigh and Wolfers (2006). 
  Figure 5 combines the World Poll and World Values Survey data using a logarithmic 
scale for income; it is identical to Figure 3 with the WVS data overlaid. The World Poll 
data are shown in red and correspond to the right hand scale; the World Values Survey 
data in blue and correspond to the left-hand scale. The World Poll uses an 11 point scale 
(0 to 10) and the World Values Surveys a 10 point scale (1 to 10.) The most important 
difference between the two surveys is that all the points at the bottom left of the diagram 
are red points, mostly from Africa. The World Poll covers many more very poor 
countries than do the World Values Surveys and the happiness and income data for these 
countries lie close to the line for middle-income and rich countries alike. Otherwise, the 
two data sets are more notable for their similarities than their differences. India and China 
are richer and unhappier in the more recent World Poll; which perhaps comes, not from 
substance, but from the fact that the World Poll is a national sample whereas the WVS, 
particularly the earlier rounds, selected Indian and Chinese (and Nigerian) samples 
largely from literate people in urban areas. At the same time, some of the Eastern 
European and former Soviet countries, unhappy though they are in 2006, are less 
unhappy than in the earlier surveys. But there is no broad contradiction between the two 
surveys, and the World Values Surveys provide no evidence against the finding from the 
World Poll that, throughout the range of national incomes, higher average incomes are 
associated with higher levels of average life satisfaction.  
  19  It is of course possible that income is standing in for something else, such as relative 
income, income relative to expectations or to past income (growth), or for other variables 
correlated with income, of which health is plausibly the most important. Indeed, the 
international pattern of life-satisfaction in relation to per capita GDP is very similar to the 
pattern between life-expectancy and income, first documented by Preston (1975).  
  Table 2 investigates the growth and health stories. Column 1 regresses average life-
satisfaction on the logarithm of income in 2003 and the average growth rate of income 
from 2000 to 2003. Note that this is mechanically equivalent to regressing life 
satisfaction on the logarithms of income in both 2000 and 2003, or indeed to regressing 
life satisfaction on the logarithm of income in 2000 and its growth from 2000 to 2003. 
The addition of growth to the regression does not eliminate the effect of income in levels, 
so that there is no evidence that the effect of income is spurious, picking up only the 
correlation between income and its growth rate. It is not true that it is only the growth of 
income that matters, not its level. Secondly, and more surprisingly, at any given level of 
income, economic growth is associated with lower reported levels of life-satisfaction, a 
result that seems inconsistent with any of the accounts in the literature, although see 
Diener, Diener, and Diener (1995) who also find a negative effect of growth on happiness 
in an international sample of college students, though not in their national samples. 
Indeed, this is one of the most puzzling and surprising results in this paper. 
  Note that growth from 2000 to 2003 is the change in log income divided by three, so 
that the regression in column 1 can also be interpreted as a levels regression in which log 
income in 2003 attracts a negative coefficient, and log income in 2000 a positive one, 
with their sum remaining at 0.860. Essentially these data cannot tell which year’s income 
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income (not shown). Yet in all of these alternative specifications, the sum of the 
coefficients on the lags remains roughly constant, which is consistent with life-
satisfaction responding to the long-term average income, as in a permanent-income 
model of life satisfaction. Column (2) also shows that the precise period of income 
growth is not important, and that the model does just as well assigning the negative 
effects of growth to the three years from 2000 to 2003, or the decade from 1990 to 2000, 
or some combination of the two. The addition of earlier growth rates does nothing to 
enhance or change these results. 
  It is also worth noting that the coefficients on growth, even when divided by three, 
are larger in absolute value than the coefficient on the current level of income. This 
implies that a regression of life-satisfaction on lagged income and current growth will 
still show a negative effect of growth; the coefficient on lagged income is the same as 
that on current income in the original regression. This finding rules out the possibility 
that the negative effect of growth comes from identifying those countries whose current 
income overstates their long-run income, and who should therefore be less happy than 
those who have been richer for longer. However we count it, income makes countries 
happy and income growth makes them unhappy. 
  The countries of Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union have some of the 
lowest levels of life-satisfaction in the world, much lower than warranted by their 
incomes. The upheavals associated with the fall of communism are likely factors, though 
they do not show up in the regressions as working through the fall in incomes, if only 
because these countries were not among the countries with the worst growth record from 
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countries did not exist in 1990, and are therefore excluded from the regression in column 
(2), see the footnote to the table. But given the robustness of the estimated negative 
effects of growth between columns (1) and (2) it seems most likely that it is features of 
the transition other than declines in income that are responsible for dissatisfaction with 
life. 
  Columns 3, 4, and 5 investigate the role of life expectancy and its rate of change. 
Because life expectancy is the standard period measure, formed from current survival 
rates, it is not a long-term measure that changes only slowly in response to changes in the 
epidemiological and social environment. There were 28 countries in the sample whose 
life expectancies fell from 1990 to 2000. Eighteen of these are in sub-Saharan Africa—as 
are all of the double-digit declines—one is Iraq (sanctions and Saddam Hussein), and the 
other nine are countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia itself. (Note that 
estimates of life-expectancy are available for these countries in 1990, although income 
estimates are not.) Yet the table shows that life-expectancy plays a very limited role in 
explaining international variations in life satisfaction. The introduction of the life-
expectancy variables has only a small effect on the estimated effects of income, so that it 
is not true that income is standing proxy for life-expectancy. Life-expectancy itself does 
not show up significantly in any of the regressions, though the increase in life-expectancy 
from 1990 to 2000 has a significant positive effect on average life-satisfaction. The 
estimated coefficient is 0.047, which would exert a sizeable negative effect on life-
satisfaction in countries in sub-Saharan Africa with large declines in life expectancy, 
such as Botswana (–20 years), Zimbabwe (–19 years) or South Africa (–16 years), but 
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were much smaller, such as Russia (–2 years).  
  I have repeated the life-satisfaction and health regressions using infant and child 
mortality measures instead of, and in addition to, life expectancy. These generate no new 
insights, largely because of the strong interrelations between the three measures in a 
single cross-section. Indeed, in the poorest and highest mortality countries, amongst 
whom the variation in life-expectancy is largest, life expectancy is often imputed using 
measures of infant and child mortality, so it is not surprising that the data should be 
unable to separate out their effects, if indeed they exist. 
  I have also experimented with a measure of the HIV prevalence rate (taken from the 
World Development Indicators). Although this is certainly measured with error, it 
reliably identifies those countries most severely affected, and to ensure that is the case, I 
constructed a dummy variable that identifies the thirteen countries with an estimated 
2003 prevalence of 5 percent or more, namely Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Haiti, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Whether added to the regressions in column (1) or column (3) of Table 2, the 
dummy attracts a small and insignificant coefficient (not shown). This is surely an 
extraordinary finding, that reported life satisfaction is unaffected by a plague whose 
severity is unparalleled in modern times. And even if people do not know that they are 
HIV positive, it is hard to believe that their satisfaction with life is unaffected when more 
than a fifth of adults are infected, and when burials of the victims are a daily occurrence. 
  Figure 2 shows that the relationship between life-satisfaction and income differs 
across the age-groups or, perhaps more obviously, that the relationship between life-
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and middle-income countries, reported life-satisfaction declines as people age. However, 
among the rich countries, the lines come together, and eventually cross so that, among the 
world’s richest countries, there is no monotone relationship between life-satisfaction and 
age. Figure 6 explores these regularities in more detail for the transition countries among 
which there is an almost uniform picture of life-satisfaction declining with age, 
sometimes quite sharply. (These graphs show unconditional averages of life-satisfaction 
with age with neither standardization nor controls.) Whatever aspects of the transition it 
is that make people unhappy, the effects appear to be much more pronounced among the 
elderly. Perhaps it is they who have suffered the adverse consequences of disruption, who 
were most satisfied with their old lives, and who cannot expect to live long enough to see 
any improvements that might occur in the future. For them, there is only transition, no 
promised land. 
  Figure 7 shows similar age-profiles of life-satisfaction for the rich English speaking 
countries of the world. Not only are these people generally much happier than people in 
the previous figure, but their life-satisfaction is in most cases U-shaped in age. Because 
of our inability to control for cohort or period effects, we cannot tell whether these U-
shapes are age-effects for people in the English speaking countries, or some mixture of 
period and cohort effects. The results from other countries (not shown here) suggest that 
there is no general (unconditional) U-shape for life-satisfaction with age in the 2006 
cross-section. Not only is life-satisfaction declining with age in the countries in Figure 4, 
but there is also somewhat milder (and less uniform) decrease with age in Latin America. 
There is no systematic pattern in the countries of Africa, Asia, or Western Europe other 
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that are specific to countries or to groups of countries. The age-related decline in life-
satisfaction in Eastern Europe and the FSU in Figure 4 is unlikely to be a pure age effect, 
but is more probably an interaction of a period effect (the transition) that was particularly 
hard on the elderly. In the rich English-speaking countries, the relatively high satisfaction 
of the elderly might be linked to the substantial intergenerational transfers from young to 
old in those countries, though this explanation would also hold for much of the rich 
world. The lack of a decline in happiness with age in sub-Saharan Africa is also hard to 
reconcile with its generally high rates of adult mortality. 
  I have replicated the income results in Tables 1 and 2 by age group, and the results 
are qualitatively similar to those for all age groups combined. For each of the age groups, 
the level of national income is an important positive determinant of life-satisfaction, and 
the rate of growth of income a negative determinant. In further work, when the individual 
income numbers from the World Poll are more developed, it may be possible to use the 
data to look at income distribution across age groups, or indeed to compare the within 
national effects of income on happiness with those estimated here from the international 
comparisons. 
 
5. Perceptions of health, disability, and health systems 
I now turn from overall life-satisfaction to satisfaction with health. World Poll 
respondents are asked whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the state of their 
personal health. The next question is whether they “have any health problems that 
prevent you from doing any of the things people of your age usually do,” again with a 
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health satisfaction) and 9 (for disability) are drawn in the same way as Figure 2, plotting 
the fraction satisfied with their health or the fraction with a disability against average per 
capita income, for everyone together—the circles with diameters proportional to 
population—or separately by age—the fitted nonparametric curves. In Figure 9, for 
disability, the circles are drawn separately for two of the age groups, ages 30–39 (black 
circles), and ages 60–70 (blue circles).  
  These figures show that people are less often disabled and are more likely to be 
satisfied with their health in richer countries, and that, less surprisingly, they become 
more disabled and less healthy as they age. As was the case for life satisfaction, the rate 
at which things get worse with age is greater in poor and middle income countries than in 
rich countries, where income seems to provide some protection against the effects of 
aging. Indeed, at the top right of Figure 8, the 50–59 age group is less satisfied with its 
health than is either of the two older groups. There is even a similar reversal for reported 
disabilities between the 50–9 and 60–9 group in Figure 9. It is most improbable that these 
reversals can be attributed to any objective health conditions or disabilities. Perhaps the 
50–9 group is particularly intolerant of the first signs of aging. 
  In health satisfaction, as in life satisfaction, the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union report extraordinary low levels. Ukraine ( rank 1), Russia (3), 
Georgia (4), Armenia (5), Belarus (6), Moldova (8), Hungary (9), Latvia (12), Estonia 
(14), Romania (15), and Kazakhstan (17) are eleven of the twenty worst countries in the 
world in health satisfaction, ranking alongside much higher mortality countries such as 
Haiti (2), Rwanda (7), Uganda (10), Burundi (11), Cambodia (14), Chad (16), Benin (18), 
  26and Cameroon (19). (South Korea is 20
th, for no immediately obvious reason.) In all of 
these countries, the fraction of people reporting themselves satisfied with their health is 
between a half and two-thirds, which is worth contrasting with the situation in some of 
countries worst-hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Tanzania (70 percent), Zimbabwe (75 
percent), Botswana and South Africa (both 78 percent), and Kenya (82 percent). Indeed, 
the percentage of Kenyans satisfied with their health is the same as the proportion of 
Britons, and is a percentage point higher than the fraction of Americans. While objective 
mortality rates have an affect on health satisfaction, at least in changes if not in levels, so 
do other factors, and the declines in life expectancy in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union have clearly had a much larger effect on reported life satisfaction than have the 
much larger declines in life expectancy in the African countries affected by HIV/AIDS.  
  The way in which health satisfaction declines with age is illustrated for two sets of 
countries in Figures 10 and 11; the former shows five selected rich countries, including 
the US and Britain, while the latter shows the Eastern European and FSU countries. In 
the 15–19 age group, almost everyone is satisfied with their health. In the rich countries, 
satisfaction falls relatively slowly, and in the US, actually improves with age after age 50, 
(probably coincidentally) overtaking the generally more stoical British at around the age 
at which the respective age-specific mortality curves cross. In the Eastern European and 
FSU group, health satisfaction falls very rapidly with age, and very large fractions of the 
elderly report themselves as dissatisfied with their health. 
  Table 3 explores the correlates of health satisfaction, following the same general 
procedures as in Tables 2 and 3. Column (1) shows, consistently with the figures, that the 
fraction of people satisfied with their health is higher in higher income countries, 
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deal smaller than for life-satisfaction. As was the case for life satisfaction, recent 
economic growth is negatively associated with health satisfaction conditional on the level 
of GDP per capita. In column (2), the level of life expectancy has no effect on health 
satisfaction, although increases in life expectancy between 1990 and 2000 are associated 
with higher health satisfaction. Because declines in life expectancy are associated either 
with HIV/AIDS (itself mostly in sub-Saharan Africa), or with the transition countries of 
Eastern Europe, I have constructed three dummy variables, one for the Eastern European 
countries, one for sub-Saharan Africa, and one the dummy for HIV prevalence that has 
already been described. The first of these dummies (“east”) attracts a negative and 
significant coefficient, the second (sub-Saharan Africa) an insignificantly negative one, 
and the third (HIV) a coefficient that is neither negative nor significant. With these 
dummies included, the change in life expectancy no longer has any effect, and the 
significance of the income variables is also reduced. This is perhaps not surprising given 
the evidence in Figure 6, where it is clear that the poor health satisfaction in the transition 
countries could not be attributed entirely to the objective decrease in life expectancy. 
These results also reinforce the fact that even high levels of HIV prevalence do not much 
affect the health satisfaction reports, certainly not in proportion to their dire effects on 
mortality. I have also interacted the dummies with the change in life expectancy (results 
not shown) to test the possibility that the changes in life expectancy have different effects 
in the different areas, or with different causes, but the estimated effects are neither 
significant nor informative. 
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their healthcare system. The World Poll asks people to report whether or not they have 
confidence in their health care or medical system. The average of this for each country is 
entered in the last row of the last column of Table 3, where it has a large and statistically 
significant coefficient. Of course, because this is itself a subjective response, we do not 
know whether it is a better or worse indicator of the actual performance of the healthcare 
system than health satisfaction is itself a good indicator of objective health. Put 
differently, both health satisfaction and healthcare confidence may be functions of third 
factors which themselves vary by region, time, or age group. And it would certainly be 
unwarranted to interpret the last column of the table as evidence that the healthcare 
system is effective in delivering health.  
  The degree of confidence in the healthcare system varies widely from country to 
country, and although it is correlated with income—see Figure 12—the correlation is 
weak. Note particularly the astonishingly low confidence that Americans in 2006 had in 
their healthcare and medical system. Almost all the inhabitants of rich countries are well-
satisfied with their healthcare and medical systems; that the US is an exception in this 
regard is well-known, see Davis et al (2007), who find also that the US does not lag in the 
effectiveness of healthcare, but does in other dimensions such as equity, access, and 
safety. Experience is much more diverse among the poor countries of the world, but 
people in some poor countries (such as Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Cuba) have 
great confidence in the healthcare system, and the majority of poor countries do much 
better than does the US, even if they deliver much worse health outcomes. The ranking of 
the US in the World Poll (81 out of 115) is even worse than in WHO (2000), though it 
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commentators, see in particular Williams (2001). 
  Given the high correlation between the subjective evaluations in different domains, 
here between personal health and the healthcare system, it is worth returning to life 
satisfaction and asking whether we can “explain” life satisfaction in terms of health 
satisfaction. This follows Easterlin (2006) who relates overall life satisfaction to 
satisfactions in the various domains and thus aggregating satisfactions into an overall 
evaluation. Certainly, if we repeat the regressions in Table 2 with health satisfaction on 
the right hand side, there is a large (close to 4) and statistically significant coefficient, and 
with this variable added, life expectancy, the change in life expectancy, and the rate of 
economic growth lose their significance. While such regressions are useful for 
understanding the life satisfaction responses (though one might just as well argue for 
regressing health satisfaction on life satisfaction), they are less useful for deciphering the 
relationship between the satisfaction reports and the objective circumstances of life. 
 
6. Discussion 
The currently dominant approach for measuring population well-being is based on Sen’s 
ideas of measuring people’s abilities to function, or their capabilities to lead a life worth 
living. Without health, there is very little that people can do and, without income, health 
alone does little to enable people to lead a good life. Other factors, such as education, or 
the ability to participate in society, are important too, although income and health tend to 
get the primary attention in evaluations of development progress, for example in the 
Millennium Development Goals. For many reasons, elaborated by Sen and others, self-
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adapt to misery and hardship, and cease to see if for what it is. They do not necessarily 
perceive their lack of freedom as a problem; the child who is potentially a great musician, 
but never has a chance to find out, will not express her lack of satisfaction, and whole 
groups can be taught that their poor health, or their lack of political participation, are 
natural or even desirable aspects of a good world.  
  Some of these issues have an empirical as well as philosophical component, and it is 
possible that reports of life satisfaction, at least on average, provide a clear-eyed 
aggregate of the different components of peoples’ capabilities. Some of the results in this 
paper are quite supportive of that position, much more so than I had originally expected. 
In particular, the very strong international relationship between per capita GDP and life 
satisfaction suggests that, on average, people have a good idea of how income, or the lack 
of it, affects their lives. It is simply not true that the people of India are as satisfied with 
their lives as the people of France, let alone Denmark, nor is it true that people in sub-
Saharan Africa, or Afghanistan, or Iraq, or Cambodia, are as happy as people in India. 
Beyond that, the misery of many of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union seems plausible enough, as does the special misery of the elderly in those 
countries. As a result, the map in Figure 1 clearly corresponds in broad detail to what an 
overall map of capabilities might look like, always supposing we could construct such a 
thing. 
  But when we turn to health and its effects on life-satisfaction, the poll results diverge 
from what would be required in the capabilities approach. Longer life expectancy surely 
enables people to do more with their lives yet, conditional in income, it has no apparent 
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have an effect, no matter whether life expectancy is high or low. Even satisfaction with 
health, a much more focused question, is not related to life expectancy, though in some 
specifications it is sensitive to changes in life expectancy, consistent with a focusing 
illusion for health. The extraordinary low health satisfaction ratings for Eastern Europe 
and the countries of the former Soviet Union are a testament, not to their poor population 
health, but to the effects of a decline in health among a population that was used to a 
better state of affairs. It is also the case that in the rich countries it is people in their 50s, 
not in their 60s or 70s, who report the least satisfaction with their health and the highest 
level of disability. Again, this is a group whose health is actually much better than that of 
their elders, but who are experiencing health problems for the first time; perhaps it is not 
poor health that is hard to bear, but the first intimations of mortality. In the poor 
countries, and particularly in Africa, where the joint evolution of man and parasites has 
ensured that, for hundreds of thousands of years, morbidity has been a constant 
companion throughout life, Iliffe (1995), health satisfaction declines rapidly with age. 
But this does not mean that health satisfaction is a good indicator of health capabilities in 
the poorest countries. That it is not so is demonstrated by the fact that countries with high 
rates of HIV prevalence do not systematically report poorer health status, a finding that is 
in line with earlier reports that self-reported health measures are often better in places 
where people are sicker, and presumably more adapted to being sick, Sen (2002), Chen 
and Murray (1992). 
  In spite of the positive relationship between life satisfaction and national income, and 
in spite of the plausibility of unhappiness and health dissatisfaction in the countries of 
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indicators of population wellbeing, if only because neither adequately reflects objective 
conditions of health. 
  Even if this conclusion is accepted—and for a different view see Graham (2005)—the 
satisfaction questions are clearly of interest in their own right, as is the analysis of their 
correlates. These are among the best measures that we have of an important aspect of 
human experience, and we need to understand what and why they are. In this respect, this 
analysis of the World Poll data has confirmed a number of earlier findings, but has 
yielded some new and different results. One surprising finding is Figure 3, the close to 
linear relationship across countries between average life satisfaction and the logarithm of 
income per head. There is no evidence that the cross-country effects of income vanish 
among the richer countries. It is also true that life satisfaction responds to changes in 
circumstances, though the effects of economic growth are negative and not positive, as 
would be predicted by previous discussion and almost all previous micro-based empirical 
evidence. Health satisfaction, in contrast, responds very weakly to (perhaps 
unsatisfactory) objective measures of health, though there is a response of the correct sign 
to changes in life expectancy, at least in some specifications.  
  The 2006 within-country age profiles of life-satisfaction are quite different from 
country to country, sometimes declining, sometimes exhibiting a U-shape, and sometimes 
showing no particular pattern. But in the 2006 cross-sections, there is a systematic 
tendency for both life and health satisfaction to decline more rapidly with age in poorer 
countries. As with many other things, wealth helps buffer the effects of aging on at least 
the perception of good health and the good life. 
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  36Table 1 
 
Cross-country regressions of average life-satisfaction on the logarithm of per capita 
GDP 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 


























































































Notes: y is real chained GDP per capita in 2003 in 2000 international $ from the Penn World Table version 
6.2. I(y>12,000) is an indicator variable that is 1 if y is greater than 12000, similarly for I(y>20,000).  
Regressions are not weighted by population. 
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Cross-country regressions of average life-satisfaction on levels and lags of per capita 
GDP and on life-expectancy 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
Income cutoff  None  None 
 
None  y < 12,000  y >= 
12,000 
ln y 2003 
s.e. 
 
growth rate 00–03 
s.e. 
 
growth rate 90–00 
s.e. 
 
Life expectancy 2000 
s.e. 
 


























































































Notes: See Table 1. Among the countries that are dropped between columns (2) and (3) are Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 
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Cross-country regressions of average health-satisfaction 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) 
ln y 2003 
s.e. 
 
growth rate 00–03 
s.e. 
 
Life expectancy 2000 
s.e. 
 
























































































































Notes: East is a dummy that is one for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, SSA is a dummy that 
is one for sub-Saharan Africa, and HIV is a dummy that is one if the estimated prevalence of HIV/AIDS is 
greater than 5 percent among 15 to 49 year olds. 
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Figure 4: Life satisfaction and national income from the World Values Surveys, 
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Countries not labeled are: POL, SVK, AZE, EST, 

























Figure 6: Declining life-satisfaction with age in Eastern Europe and the FSU 
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Circles are proportional to population
and are for averages over all ages > 15



















































Per capita GDP in 2003, 2000 chained PPP dollars
Blue circles age 60-70


























































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Satisfaction with healthcare and income 
 
  45